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TRANSFORMATIVE PROPERTIES OF FDR’S COURT-PACKING 
PLAN AND THE SIGNIFICANCE OF SYMBOL 
Laura A. Cisneros! 
INTRODUCTION 
From the moment it was made public on February 5, 1937,1 Frank-
lin D. Roosevelt’s judicial reorganization, or “Court-Packing Plan,” 
has captured the interest and imagination of journalists, historians, 
political scientists, the legal academy, and the public at large, not to 
mention the President, members of Congress, and the Supreme 
Court.2  Whether one subscribes to the conventional narrative which 
 
 ! Associate Professor of Law, Golden Gate University School of Law.  This Article was draft-
ed for a symposium on “FDR and Obama:  Are there Constitutional Law Lessons from the 
New Deal for the Obama Administration?” hosted by the University of Pennsylvania Law 
School on January 20, 2012.  I thank the symposium organizers for the opportunity to 
share my scholarship.  For their comments and criticisms in the course of our symposium, 
I am pleased to thank my fellow panelists and the engaged audience in attendance.  Fi-
nally, I am grateful to my family, friends, and colleagues for their continued encourage-
ment and support. 
 1 LEONARD BAKER, BACK TO BACK:  THE DUEL BETWEEN FDR AND THE SUPREME COURT 3–9 
(1967) (discussing President Roosevelt’s special message read to Congress by Attorney 
General Homer Cummings on February 5, 1937, which proposed legislation granting the 
President power to appoint additional judges to all federal courts, including the Supreme 
Court, whenever there were sitting judges age seventy or older who refused to retire). 
 2 See, e.g., JOSEPH ALSOP & TURNER CATLEDGE, THE 168 DAYS (1938); JAMES MACGREGOR 
BURNS, PACKING THE COURT:  THE RISE OF JUDICIAL POWER AND THE COMING CRISIS OF 
THE SUPREME COURT (2009); BARRY CUSHMAN, RETHINKING THE NEW DEAL COURT:  THE 
STRUCTURE OF A CONSTITUTIONAL REVOLUTION (1998); NOAH FELDMAN, SCORPIONS:  THE 
BATTLES AND TRIUMPHS OF FDR’S GREAT SUPREME COURT JUSTICES (2010); ROBERT H. 
JACKSON, THE STRUGGLE FOR JUDICIAL SUPREMACY:  A STUDY OF A CRISIS IN AMERICAN 
POWER POLITICS (1941); MARIAN C. MCKENNA, FRANKLIN ROOSEVELT AND THE GREAT 
CONSTITUTIONAL WAR:  THE COURT-PACKING CRISIS OF 1937 (2002); JEFF SHESOL, 
SUPREME POWER:  FRANKLIN ROOSEVELT VS. THE SUPREME COURT (2010); BURT SOLOMON, 
FDR V. THE CONSTITUTION:  THE COURT-PACKING FIGHT AND THE TRIUMPH OF 
DEMOCRACY (2009); Gregory A. Caldeira, Public Opinion and The U.S. Supreme Court:  FDR’s 
Court-Packing Plan, 81 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 1139 (1987); Daniel E. Ho & Kevin M. Quinn, 
Did a Switch in Time Save Nine?, 2 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 69 (2010); Stephan O. Kline, Revisiting 
FDR’s Court Packing Plan:  Are the Current Attacks on Judicial Independence So Bad?, 30 
MCGEORGE L. REV. 863 (1999); William E. Leuchtenburg, The Origins of Franklin D. Roose-
velt’s “Court-Packing” Plan, 1966 SUP. CT. REV. 347 (1966); Michael Nelson, The President 
and the Court:  Reinterpreting the Court-packing Episode of 1937, 103 POL. SCI. Q. 267 (1988); 
William G. Ross, When Did the “Switch in Time” Actually Occur?:  Re-discovering the Supreme 
Court’s “Forgotten” Decisions of 1936–1937, 37 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1153 (2005). 
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identifies the Court-Packing Plan as the impetus for the Court’s shift 
on politically-charged constitutional questions,3 or the counter-
narrative which argues that the Court’s internal dynamics of doctrinal 
development, not the Court-Packing Plan, caused the Court to 
change its position on New Deal legislation,4 there is no doubt that 
the Court-Packing Plan represents an important episode in American 
history. 
The Plan well deserves this status, not just for the role it played in 
the 1930s, but for the role it continues to play in contemporary con-
stitutional politics.  In the 1930s, the Court-Packing Plan forced Con-
gress to develop an institutional response to the President, which, 
among other things, realigned the balance of power among the polit-
ical branches.  The Plan operated to de-personalize the office of the 
President by separating the charisma and character of the man from 
the powers and limitations of the office.5  It allowed Congress to reas-
sert its power vis-à-vis the President,6 but it also created factions within 
the Democratic Party.7  Finally, the Plan’s failure created a de facto 
bar on future attempts to reorganize the Supreme Court, arguably al-
 
 3 See, e.g., ALSOP & CATLEDGE, supra note 2 at 140–41; BAKER, supra note 1, at 174 (“The 
Administration naturally believed the shift in the Court’s philosophy was a riposte to Roo-
sevelt’s original thrust on February 5.”). 
 4 See, e.g., CUSHMAN, supra note 2, at 4–5; MCKENNA, supra note 2, at xxii, xxiii (acknowledg-
ing that “[t]he older versions [of interpretations of the Court-packing fight] tried to es-
tablish a direct link between the 1936 election, the court bill, the ‘switch in time’ theory, 
and ‘constitutional revolution’ of 1937,” but arguing that these events “had no bearing on 
the decisions reached by the justices in subsequent cases coming before them for re-
view”); id. at xxv–xxvi (discussing how conventional accounts of constitutional history be-
gan to attach political labels to individual Justices in the 1930s, whether or not they were 
appropriate, causing the “whole of judicial decision making in the 1930s [to have be-
come] distorted to fit [a] modernist [political label]” (citing G. EDWARD WHITE, THE 
CONSTITUTION AND THE NEW DEAL 300 (2000))); Barry Cushman, Rethinking the New Deal 
Court, 80 VA. L. REV. 201, 205–08 (1994). 
 5 See, e.g., MERLO J. PUSEY, THE SUPREME COURT CRISIS 22–26 (1937) (noting Roosevelt’s 
vigorous attack upon the Supreme Court in his March 4th address at the Democratic Vic-
tory Dinner.  Pusey contrasts this with reaction to Roosevelt’s speech:  “No doubt this line 
of approach produced many emotional reactions in favor of the discipline which the 
President wishe[d] to administer to our highest tribunal.”). 
 6 See, e.g., SHESOL, supra note 2, at 457–58 (“Roosevelt’s relationship with Congress was 
worse than it had ever been . . . . What had begun as a struggle between the president and 
the Court was now a struggle between the president and Congress. . . . [One Senator 
commented,] ‘We have retreated from one battle to the other during the last four 
years . . . . But this is Gettysburg.’”); SOLOMON, supra note 2, at 4 (“[T]he opposition 
sprung up immediately and mounted a sustained attack on the Court bill that left it little 
chance of succeeding.”); Michael E. Parrish, The Great Depression, The New Deal, and The 
American Legal Order, 59 WASH. L. REV. 723, 737 (1984). 
 7 See, e.g., BAKER, supra note 1, at 97–99; SHESOL, supra note 2, at 525. 
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lowing the Court the security necessary to transform itself into a pow-
erful force for social change. 
However, it is the Court-Packing Plan’s role as a rhetorical de-
vice—its symbolism—that is of greatest interest to me and is the sub-
ject of this Article. 
When we think of rhetoric, we immediately think of Aristotle, who 
extended the study of rhetoric beyond Plato’s criticism of it as “im-
moral, dangerous, and unworthy of serious study.”8  Aristotle taught 
that rhetoric was a valuable tool for rational inquiry about experi-
ence, which could then lead to knowledge.9  He viewed rhetoric as a 
system of persuasion based on knowledge, not as a cynical exercise of 
factual manipulation,10 and he believed it could be useful in resolving 
practical problems.11 
Unfortunately, the word “rhetoric” has suffered a serious decline 
in popular perception.  To some, rhetoric has come to describe lan-
guage that is empty, willfully deceitful, and just plain dishonest.  But 
this popular perception is incomplete, as there is value in a rhetorical 
orientation, especially when applied to judicial opinions.12  To make 
use of all that a rhetorical orientation toward judicial opinions can 
offer, one must look at rhetoric as something other than a way of 
dressing up lies and making poor decisions sound respectable; and 
one must approach judges not just as legal decisionmakers, but as 
writers.  In this context, rhetoric describes the way a judge uses or ar-
ranges language to persuade a particular audience.  How a judge uses 
and arranges language often reveals the underlying assumptions in 
his or her arguments; and understanding these assumptions is critical 
to forming an intelligent response to the legal opinion in question.  A 
rhetorical analysis of a judicial opinion is important because what a 
 
 8 PLATO, LYSIS, SYMPOSIUM, GORGIAS 319 (Jeffrey Henderson ed., W.R.M. Lamb trans., Har-
vard Univ. Press (1925)) (1967). 
 9 ARISTOTLE, THE ART OF RHETORIC 1355b (H.C. Lawson-Tancred trans., 1991). 
 10 ARISTOTLE, THE ART OF RHETORIC 1354a (H.C. Lawson-Tancred trans., 1991) (“For 
speakers ought not to distract the judge by driving him to anger, envy or compassion—
that would be rather as if one were deliberately to make crooked a ruler that one was in-
tending to use.”). 
 11 Cf. GEORGE A. KENNEDY, CLASSICAL RHETORIC AND ITS CHRISTIAN AND SECULAR TRADITION 
FROM ANCIENT TO MODERN TIMES 77–78 (1980) (outlining several components of Aristo-
tle’s theory of rhetoric and their intended effects and applications). 
 12 In this, I am not alone.  See Erwin Chemerinsky, The Rhetoric of Constitutional Law, 100 
MICH. L. REV. 2008, 2008 (2002) (“Increasingly, though, I have begun to think that this 
functional approach [to dealing with Supreme Court opinions] is overlooking a crucial 
aspect of Supreme Court decisions:  their rhetoric. . . . I believe that we can gain new in-
sights about the Court and constitutional law by looking at the opinions from a rhetorical 
perspective.”). 
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judge decides as a legal reality is shaped by the words he or she uses.13  
What judges say is inescapably a product of how they say it. 
*** 
To understand the rhetorical significance of the Court-Packing 
Plan, I asked, “What do we talk about when we talk about the Court-
Packing Plan?”  The answer I discovered is:  it depends. 
I reviewed Supreme Court and lower federal court cases that cited 
to the episode.  Tracing the rhetorical journey of the Court-Packing 
Plan, I learned that federal courts do employ it as a symbol, though 
not always in the same way.  Scholars refer to the controversy sur-
rounding the Court-Packing Plan using various phrases, including, 
“Court-packing fight,”14 “constitutional crisis of 1937,”15 and “constitu-
tional revolution of 1937.”16  The two predominant phrases used by 
federal courts, however, are “Court-Packing Plan” and “switch in time 
that saved nine.”17  In judicial opinions, the event functions as a lin-
guistic trope—a rhetorical figure of speech—to further an underlying 
institutional argument.  Generally speaking, courts tend to use the 
term “Court-packing” to signify external threats to the Court’s legiti-
macy and the term “switch in time” to signify internal threats to the 
Court’s legitimacy.  The “Court-Packing Plan” language is used to 
make broader arguments about judicial independence and the need 
to protect the judiciary as an institution.  The “switch in time” lan-
 
 13 Id. at 2010 (“[T]he opinions written by the Justices and issued by the Court are a central, 
not an incidental, aspect of American constitutional law and that focusing on the opin-
ions as rhetoric can help us to understand and appraise the Supreme Court’s work.”). 
 14 See, e.g., Barry Friedman, The Birth of an Academic Obsession:  The History of the Countermajori-
tarian Difficulty, Part Five, 112 YALE L.J. 153, 256 (2002); Gerard N. Magliocca, Court-
Packing and the Child Labor Amendment, 27 CONST. COMMENT. 455, 460 (2011); L.A. Powe, 
Jr., The Court’s Constitution, 12 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 529, 536 (2010). 
 15 See, e.g., James A. Henretta, Charles Evans Hughes and the Strange Death of Liberal America, 24 
LAW & HIST. REV. 115, 137 (2006); Nancy Staudt & Yilei He, The Macroeconomic Court:  
Rhetoric and Implications of New Deal Decision-Making, 5 NW. J. L. & SOC. POL’Y 87, 88 (2010); 
George Steven Swan, The Political Economy of the O’Connor Court:  Professor Thomas M. Keck 
Vindicated, 33 OKLA. CITY U. L. REV. 151, 210 (2008). 
 16 See, e.g., Cushman, supra note 4, at 204; Daniel E. Ho & Kevin M. Quinn, How Not to Lie 
with Judicial Votes:  Misconceptions, Measurement, and Models, 98 CALIF. L. REV. 813, 855 
(2010); Brian Z. Tamanaha, Understanding Legal Realism, 87 TEX. L. REV. 731, 771 (2009); 
G. Edward White, Response, The Lost Origins of American Judicial Review, 78 GEO. WASH. L. 
REV. 1145, 1148 (2010). 
 17  For examples of use of the phrases “Court-Packing Plan” and “switch in time saves nine,” 
see e.g., BARRY CUSHMAN, RETHINKING THE NEW DEAL (1998); WILLIAM E. 
LEUCHTENBURG, THE SUPREME COURT REBORN: THE CONSTITUTIONAL REVOLUTION IN 
THE AGE OF ROOSEVELT (1995); David E. Ho & Kevin M. Quinn, Did a Switch in Time Save 
Nine?, 2 J. Legal Analysis 69 (2010). 
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guage is used to make broader arguments about proper restraints on 
the Court’s interpretive methodology. 
In this Article, I begin by laying a basic theoretical foundation for 
understanding how language choice provides contextual cues to di-
rect interpretation.  Next, I analyze cases that use the “Court-Packing 
Plan” language.  I argue that these references are intended to trigger 
a response in the reader that is sympathetic to judicial independence 
and, in some instances, to judicial incursions into policymaking.  I 
then analyze references to the “switch in time” language, extracting 
the arguments about constitutional methodology and judicial activ-
ism embedded in that phrase.  Here, I argue that the phrase “switch 
in time” is deployed to remind the reader of what happens when the 
Court overreaches and finds it necessary to radically change course or 
risk permanent institutional damage.  Finally, I consider the implica-
tions of using both of these phrases in the same opinion.  I contend 
that attention to language choice uncovers how the judiciary uses the 
institutional clash of the 1930s as a rhetorical tool and reveals how 
this episode in America’s political and legal history entered our cul-
ture of argument about our system of government and the role of the 
judiciary as a constitutional decision-making body within that system. 
I.  THEORETICAL GROUNDING:  AGENDA-SETTING, AGENDA-EXTENSION, 
AND FRAMING ANALYSIS 
“Judicial opinions are rhetorical performances.”18  Federal jurists 
often use rhetoric in judicial opinions “as a tool to stay within the 
constraints placed upon them by law” while giving them “some room 
to develop the law in certain ways.”19  As an actor in a rhetorical per-
formance, the judicial opinion writer is concerned with, among other 
things, “persuading the audience and demonstrating a certain au-
thority over it.”20  In this regard, understanding approaches to rhetor-
ical analysis—in particular, rhetorical analysis of the media—is in-
structive. 
A common approach used by communication researchers to study 
the press and other media is called framing analysis.  This approach 
allows communication researchers to study how the press’s publica-
tion choices may effectively set an agenda by presenting the general 
 
 18 Sanford Levinson, The Rhetoric of the Judicial Opinion, in LAW’S STORIES:  NARRATIVE AND 
RHETORIC IN THE LAW 187, 187 (Peter Brooks & Paul Gewirtz eds., 1996). 
 19 Ruth C. Vance, Judicial Opinion Writing:  An Annotated Bibliography, 17 J. LEGAL WRITING 
INST. 197, 226 (2011). 
 20 Levinson, supra note 18, at 187. 
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public with a confined number of topics to think about.  The infor-
mal beginning of this approach is traced to a statement made by Ber-
nard C. Cohen in 1963.  Cohen remarked, “[the press] may not be 
successful much of the time in telling people what to think, but it is 
stunningly successful in telling its readers what to think about.”21  
“[T]he world looks different to different people,” Cohen continued, 
“depending . . . on the map that is drawn for them by the writers, edi-
tors, and publishers of the papers they read.”22  This idea formally de-
veloped into a theory of agenda-setting by Dr. Maxwell E. McCombs 
and Dr. Donald L. Shaw in their study of the 1968 presidential elec-
tion.  In their studies, Maxwell and Shaw found that voters learn 
about an issue in direct proportion to the attention given that issue 
by the press.23  Broadly speaking, the agenda-setting theory posits that 
the media exerts a tremendous influence in telling the general public 
what to think and in so doing obtains the ability to direct and affect 
political decisionmaking.24 
This initial understanding of agenda-setting—telling the public 
what to think about—developed into a secondary understanding of 
agenda-extending—telling the public how to think about it.25  Specifi-
cally, agenda-extending focuses beyond the subjects of the news sto-
ries the media provides to the general public and concentrates on the 
“contextual cues or frames in which to evaluate those subjects.”26  
Framing analysis provides one approach for investigating and under-
standing how the process moves from agenda-setting to agenda-
extending.27  According to William Gamson, a frame provides contex-
tual cues through which the reader, listener, or audience may inter-
pret the particular facts of a subject:  “[facts] take on their meaning 
by being embedded in a frame or story line that organizes them and 
gives them coherence, selecting certain ones to emphasize while ig-
 
 21 BERNARD C. COHEN, THE PRESS AND FOREIGN POLICY 13 (1963). 
 22 Id. 
 23 Maxwell E. McCombs & Donald L. Shaw, Agenda-Setting and the Political Process, in DONALD 
L. SHAW & MAXWELL E. MCCOMBS, THE EMERGENCE OF AMERICAN POLITICAL ISSUES:  THE 
AGENDA-SETTING FUNCTION OF THE PRESS 149, 153 (1977). 
 24 Jim A. Kuypers, Framing Analysis, in RHETORICAL CRITICISM:  PERSPECTIVES IN ACTION 181, 
182 (Jim A. Kuypers ed., 2009). 
 25 See, e.g., Anne Johnston, Trends in Political Communication:  A Selective Review of Research in 
the 1980s, in NEW DIRECTIONS IN POLITICAL COMMUNICATION:  A RESOURCE BOOK 329, 337 
(David L. Swanson & Dan Nimmo eds., 1990). 
 26 Id. (citing Shanto Iyengar et al., Experimental Demonstrations of the “Not-So-Minimal” Conse-
quences of Television News Programs, 76 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 848, 848–58 (1982)). 
 27 Kuypers, supra note 24, at 185. 
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noring others.”28  This emphasis and de-emphasis makes some infor-
mation more accessible to the audience, privileging some infor-
mation or viewpoints over others, thereby creating a hierarchy of sali-
ent information that in turn constructs a particular reality.29  The 
remainder of this Article analyzes the judiciary’s use of the “Court-
packing” and “switch in time” language and considers the implica-
tions of choosing one frame over the other to describe the 1937 insti-
tutional clash initiated by Franklin D. Roosevelt’s judicial reorganiza-
tion proposal. 
II.  REFERENCE TO THE COURT-PACKING PLAN TO ADVANCE AN 
ARGUMENT FOR JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE 
The 1937 institutional clash quietly entered judicial discourse.  It 
began its rhetorical journey as an implicit reference in a concurring 
opinion.  However, it has since developed into a valuable rhetorical 
tool.  This section traces that development and discusses how judicial 
writers have appropriated the historical moment to advance an ar-
gument about judicial independence.  In particular, this section con-
siders how the choice to frame the 1937 clash as a “Court-Packing 
Plan” acts as a defense of judicial independence against external at-
tack. 
A. Justice Frankfurter’s Concurrence in Youngstown Sheet Tube Co. v. 
Sawyer:  The Power of the Implicit Historical Reference 
In 1939, Franklin Roosevelt nominated Harvard Law professor Fe-
lix Frankfurter to the Supreme Court.30  It has often been said that 
Frankfurter filled the vacancy known as the scholar’s seat, given that 
Justices Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. and Benjamin Cardozo were its 
two former occupants.31  Although breaking with tradition and re-
 
 28 William A. Gamson, News As Framing:  Comments On Graber, 33 AM. BEHAV. SCIENTIST 157, 
157 (1989). 
 29 Robert M. Entman, Framing:  Toward Clarification of a Fractured Paradigm, 43 J. COMM., Dec. 
1993, at 51, 53. 
 30 LUCAS A. POWE, JR., THE SUPREME COURT AND THE AMERICAN ELITE, 1789–2008, at 214 
(2009); PETER CHARLES HOFFER ET AL., THE SUPREME COURT:  AN ESSENTIAL HISTORY 267 
(2007). 
 31 HELEN SHIRLEY THOMAS, FELIX FRANKFURTER:  SCHOLAR ON THE BENCH vii–viii (1960); 
Melvin I. Urofsky, Essay, William O. Douglas As A Common Law Judge, 41 DUKE L.J. 133, 150 
n.118 (1992) (“The scholar’s seat was the common appellation used in the 1930s and 
1940s to refer to the seat held by Frankfurter and his predecessors.  Horace Gray, who 
taught at the Harvard Law School, held the seat from 1881 to 1902; he was succeeded by 
Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., who served until 1932.  The scholarly Benjamin Nathan 
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quiring the nominee to testify before the Senate Judiciary Commit-
tee—the first time since 192532—the Senate confirmed Frankfurter 
without dissent.33  In his concurrence in Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. 
v. Sawyer, Frankfurter made the first, albeit oblique, reference to the 
Court-Packing Plan found in any federal court opinion.34  Although 
Frankfurter’s concurrence was largely immaterial to the outcome of 
the litigation,35 the case presented him with a rare opportunity to dis-
cuss the analytical framework of separation of powers issues in gen-
eral and executive action in particular.  Thus, Frankfurter felt com-
pelled to write.36 
Youngstown Sheet is perhaps the best known of the Court’s presi-
dential power cases.37  In 1952, in the midst of the Korean War, Presi-
dent Truman ordered Secretary of Commerce Charles Sawyer to seize 
and operate most of the nation’s steel mills as a means of mitigating 
the effects of a potential strike by the United Steelworkers of Ameri-
ca.38  In a 6-3 decision, the Court held that the President did not have 
authority to issue such an order.39  Writing for the majority, Justice 
Black said that “[t]he President’s power, if any, to issue the order 
 
Cardozo replaced Holmes, and Cardozo was replaced by Professor Felix Frankfurter in 
1939.”). 
 32 Paul Freund, Appointment of Justices:  Some Historical Perspectives, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1146, 
1158 & n.54 (1988) (noting that with the exception of Justice Stone in 1925, questioning 
of a Supreme Court nominee began with Felix Frankfurter in 1939:  “There was one ex-
ception to the old practice [of not questioning nominees].  In 1925, the Committee al-
lowed Harlan F. Stone to appear in order to explain his conduct as Attorney General in 
declining to dismiss an indictment, believed to have been politically inspired, brought by 
his predecessor against Senator Burton Wheeler of Montana.  The questioning was lim-
ited to that issue, and Stone evidently emerged with his position strengthened.”); Geof-
frey R. Stone, Understanding Supreme Court Confirmations, 2010 SUP. CT. REV. 381, 426 
(2010) (commenting that “Frankfurter was the first Justice ever ‘invited’ by the [Senate 
Judiciary] Committee” to give testimony and answer questions). 
 33 FELDMAN, supra note 2, at 163; PETER IRONS, A PEOPLE’S HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT:  
THE MEN AND WOMEN WHOSE CASES AND DECISIONS HAVE SHAPED OUR CONSTITUTION 
328 (2000). 
 34 Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 593 (1952) (Frankfurter, J., con-
curring). 
 35 Id. at 589 (“Although the considerations relevant to the legal enforcement of the princi-
ple of separation of powers seem to me more complicated and flexible than may appear 
from what Mr. Justice Black has written, I join his opinion because I thoroughly agree 
with the application of the principle to the circumstances of this case.”). 
 36 Id. at 589 (“Even though such differences in attitude toward this principle may be merely 
differences in emphasis and nuance, they can hardly be reflected by a single opinion for 
the Court.  Individual expression of views in reaching a common result is therefore im-
portant.”). 
 37 Patricia L. Bellia, The Story of the Steel Seizure Case, in PRESIDENTIAL POWER STORIES 233, 
233 (Christopher H. Schroeder & Curtis A. Bradley eds., 2009). 
 38 Youngstown Sheet, 343 U.S. at 582–83. 
 39 Id. at 585. 
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must stem either from an act of Congress or from the Constitution 
itself.”40  The Court found that no statute authorized the President’s 
seizure, and the power to seize the mills was not implicit in the execu-
tive’s Article II powers granted by the Constitution.41 
Although Frankfurter joined the majority, he wrote separately to 
explain the independent basis for his agreement with the overall re-
sult.  Rather than recount the facts of the case, Frankfurter used the 
first eight paragraphs of his concurrence to set the tone and frame 
the topic for the rest of his opinion.  In the first sentence of the se-
cond paragraph, Frankfurter wrote: 
[The Founders of this Nation] rested the structure of our central gov-
ernment on the system of checks and balances.  For them the doctrine of 
separation of powers was not mere theory; it was a felt necessity.  Not so 
long ago it was fashionable to find our system of checks and balances ob-
structive to effective government.  It was easy to ridicule that system as 
outmoded—too easy.42 
The first thing to note about this passage is the implicit nature of the 
allusion to the Court-Packing Plan.  Nowhere in this passage does 
Frankfurter expressly cite to the Court-packing episode by name.  Ra-
ther, the reader must rely on the linguistic cues Frankfurter uses to 
draw the connection. 
The first such cue is the placement of the phrase “not so long 
ago” in the same sentence as the word “obstructive.”  Beginning in 
1935, during Roosevelt’s first term, the Supreme Court repeatedly 
struck down New Deal legislative measures aimed at economic recov-
ery as being outside the scope of the federal government’s power.43  
Throughout this period, Roosevelt voiced his frustration with these 
decisions.  He referred to these decisions—and to the Justices who 
made them—as obstructionist, political, and an impediment to the 
government’s recovery efforts.44  The second linguistic cue is con-
 
 40 Id. 
 41 Id. at 587–88. 
 42 Id. at 593 (Frankfurter, J., concurring). 
 43 See, e.g., Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238 (1936) (holding the Bituminous Coal 
Conservation Act of 1935 unconstitutional); United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1 (1936) 
(holding the Agricultural Adjustment Act unconstitutional); Louisville Joint Stock Land 
Bank v. Radford, 295 U.S. 555 (1935) (holding the Frazier-Lemke Act unconstitutional); 
A. L. A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935) (holding the Na-
tional Industrial Recovery Act unconstitutional); R.R. Ret. Bd. v. Alton R.R. Co., 295 U.S. 
330 (1935) (holding the Railroad Retirement Act unconstitutional); Panama Refining 
Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388 (1935) (holding § 9(c) of the National Industrial Recovery Act 
unconstitutional). 
 44 In one of his famous Fireside Chats, Roosevelt described the problem of the obstruction-
ist Supreme Court that had prompted his proposal to reorganize the judiciary:  “Last 
Thursday I described the American form of Government as a three horse team provided 
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tained in the passage’s statement that “[i]t was easy to ridicule that 
system [of checks and balances] as outmoded . . . .”45  This alludes to 
Roosevelt’s effort to denigrate the Court in the media, where he fa-
mously said that the Hughes Court’s position on economics was 
trapped in the “horse-and-buggy” era.46  Roosevelt’s use of this term 
was to paint the Court’s economic philosophy (and by implication 
their decisions striking down New Deal economic legislation) as out-
dated and wholly unsuited to resolve the modern-day financial crisis.  
By using the words “ridicule,” and “outmoded,” Frankfurter is able to 
remind his readers of Roosevelt’s attempt to destabilize the Court in 
the name of economic necessity and to capitalize on the symbolic 
power associated with the triumph of the tripartite system of checks 
and balances in the 1937 Court battle. 
Frankfurter’s decision to refer to the Court-Packing Plan by im-
plicit allusion can be understood in at least three ways.  First, Youngs-
town Sheet is a separation of powers case, and the greatest separation 
of powers clash up to 1952 was Roosevelt’s 1937 attempt to legislative-
ly “reorganize” the federal judiciary.47  Given this similarity and the 
fact that these events were separated by a mere fifteen years, it was 
reasonable for Frankfurter to assume his target audience—i.e., the 
upper-crust of legal professionals—would pick up on his reference to 
the earlier separation of powers clash.  Second, by alluding to the 
Court-Packing Plan through the euphemism of separation of powers 
 
by the Constitution to the American people so that their field might be plowed.  The 
three horses are, of course, the three branches of government—the Congress, the Execu-
tive and the Courts.  Two of the horses are pulling in unison today; the third is not. . . . In 
the last four years the sound rule of giving statutes the benefit of all reasonable doubt has 
been cast aside.  The Court has been acting not as a judicial body, but as a policy-making 
body.  When the Congress has sought to stabilize national agriculture, to improve the 
conditions of labor, to safeguard business against unfair competition, to protect our na-
tional resources, and in many other ways, to serve our clearly national needs, the majority 
of the Court has been assuming the power to pass on the wisdom of these Acts of the 
Congress—and to approve or disapprove the public policy written into these laws.”  
Franklin D. Roosevelt, Fireside Chat (Mar. 9, 1937), available at http://www.presidency.
ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=15381. 
 45 Youngstown Sheet, 343 U.S. at 593 (Frankfurter, J., concurring). 
 46 Franklin D. Roosevelt, The Two Hundred and Ninth Press Conference. May 31, 1935, in 4 THE 
PUBLIC PAPERS AND ADDRESSES OF FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT:  THE COURT DISAPPROVES, 
1935, at 200, 221 (Samuel I. Rosenman ed., 1938). 
 47 The text of the bill and accompanying messages from Roosevelt and Attorney General 
Homer S. Cummings are printed at 81 CONG. REC. 876, 876–80 (1937).  The bill’s most 
controversial provision permitted the President to appoint an additional Justice to the 
Supreme Court for each sitting Justice who did not retire within six months of his seven-
tieth birthday.  Id. at 880.  If passed, the President would have been able to appoint six 
additional Justices immediately, as six sitting Justices on the Court fit the provision’s crite-
rion. 
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language, Frankfurter was able to depersonalize the Court’s ruling, 
which was to declare President Truman’s action unconstitutional.48  
Or, to put it differently, Frankfurter would have been unable to main-
tain his respectful tone toward President Truman had he explicitly 
compared the steel mill seizures to Roosevelt’s Court-Packing Plan; 
yet he wanted to make the connection to establish the Court’s right 
and authority to rule on the actions of the executive branch.  It is in-
teresting to note how Frankfurter accomplishes this delicate form of 
argumentative staging.  The passage is structured to preempt criti-
cism that the Court in Youngstown was simply being obstructionist by 
framing the issue within the broader scheme of the system of checks 
and balances.  Finally, Frankfurter’s rhetorical choice allows him to 
avoid having to characterize the 1937 incident in any particular way—
either as the “Court-Packing Plan” or “the switch in time that saved 
nine.”  In this way, he avoids committing to a loaded phrase or identi-
fying with one camp or the other.  By not committing to either 
phrase, he avoids signaling disrespect for the President and venerat-
ing the judiciary or demeaning the judiciary and exalting the Execu-
tive.  The implicit allusion allows him to characterize the historical 
event on his own terms and thereby hover well above the cultural de-
bate about the incident and instead use it to make his point about the 
larger separation of powers issue. 
As Frankfurter presents the issue, it is not that the Court wants to 
interfere in the relationship between Congress and the President; ra-
ther, the system of checks and balances requires that the Court render 
a decision.  Thus, defending the scope of the judiciary’s power per se 
is incidental to protecting the larger structural scheme.  Again, for 
Frankfurter the question is not whether the Court wants to oppose 
the President or wants to define the power boundary between the po-
litical branches; rather, the question is whether the Court, as an es-
sential component of the checks and balances system, must exercise 
its duty to “say [sic] what the law is.”49  In this way, the Court-Packing 
Plan—although never identified by name—operates as a recognizable 
symbol of the need to protect the Court’s position within the tripar-
tite structure of American government. 
Frankfurter’s language choices also argue for a long view when as-
sessing the Court’s role vis-à-vis the political branches, even when the 
Court’s decisions appear in the short-term to be obstinate or ignorant 
of political realities.  For example, he writes:  “[n]ot so long ago it was 
 
 48 Youngstown Sheet, 343 U.S. at 587. 
 49 Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 177 (1803). 
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fashionable to find our system of checks and balances obstructive to 
effective government.”50  The word “fashionable,” as used in this con-
text, functions as a constitutional pejorative.  It denotes things that 
are ephemeral and shallow, as fashion trends and tastes are constant-
ly changing, rising and falling at the whim of a momentarily stimulat-
ed public.  In addition, particular fashions become trends because 
they have mass appeal, which is not necessarily a bad thing, except 
that in the context of constitutional adjudication, it feels a bit like 
mob rule.  Things that are “fashionable” tend to follow a well-
established and cyclical pattern:  (1) rapid purchase—bordering on 
the viral—by the masses soon after introduction into the market, (2) 
consumer accumulation at a rate where the incidences of purchase 
are exceedingly disproportionate to the length of time elapsed, (3) 
product saturation in the market, and (4) displacement of product A 
with newly introduced product B, beginning a new cycle.  The me-
chanics of this type of cycle imply that the public has not been espe-
cially thoughtful about the reasons for buying into the trend or the 
long-term consequences of following it.  By relating the fleeting cycle 
of fashion to the public’s willingness to disparage our tri-institutional 
system, Frankfurter is able to point out that even if the public does 
not like a particular decision (or set of decisions) of the Court, there 
is more at stake, namely the durability and stability of the American 
scheme of republican government. 
As I will show below, however, judicial references to the Court-
Packing Plan were never again as subtle as the one crafted by Frank-
furter in Youngstown Sheet.  This is probably because the authors of 
these later opinions could not assume, as Frankfurter did, that their 
target audience would pick up on the shadow reference to the Court-
Packing Plan—its implied symbolism—by mere language cues alone; 
too much time elapsed between 1937 and the date these subsequent 
cases came to the Court.  The judges who wrote the later opinions 
would need to allude to the “Court-Packing Plan” or the “switch in 
time” more directly, or risk that their references would hang in the 
ether between reader and writer, ungrasped or misunderstood.  As a 
result, however, they lost some of the flexibility Frankfurter main-
tained for himself.  That is, they had to choose a camp and commit 
openly to a position with respect to the Court’s power to review and 
strike down actions of the political branches.  The Court-Packing 
Plan, as a symbol, became at once more powerful and unwieldy. 
 
 50 Youngstown Sheet, 343 U.S. at 593 (Frankfurter, J., concurring). 
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B. Justice Brennan’s Dissent in National League of Cities v. Usery:  
Using the “Court-Packing Plan” Trope as a Warning of Possible 
External Threats to the Judiciary 
In 1976, in National League of Cities v. Usery,51 Justice William Bren-
nan made the first explicit reference to the Court-Packing Plan in a 
Supreme Court opinion, and he did so to criticize the majority for in-
terfering with the policymaking function of Congress.  Contained 
within a dissent strongly critical of the Court’s decision in National 
League, Brennan appealed to the 1937 incident as a warning to all 
concerned—but especially his brethren on the Court—of what hap-
pens when the judicial branch unduly impedes legislative action and 
thereby invites retaliation from the political branches. 
In 1974, Congress amended the Fair Labor Standards Act 
(“FLSA”) to extend coverage of the minimum wage and maximum 
hour provisions to nearly all public employees employed by states and 
their political subdivisions.52  In National League, numerous states and 
their political subdivisions challenged these amendments asserting a 
claim of intergovernmental immunity.53  In a 5-4 decision, the Court 
held that while the general subject matter of wages and hours is with-
in the scope of Congress’s Commerce Clause power,54 Congress may 
not regulate the wages and hours set by a state as an employer, because 
federal law operated to “directly displace the States’ freedom to struc-
ture integral operations in areas of traditional governmental func-
tions.”55  The majority’s decision in National League reinvigorated the 
Tenth Amendment56 as a defense to federal action by concluding that 
the 1974 FLSA Amendments interfered with traditional aspects of 
state sovereignty.  Invoking the ultimate personification of judicial in-
tegrity, Brennan’s dissent begins by placing the majority’s decision in 
direct opposition to Chief Justice John Marshall: 
It must therefore be surprising that my Brethren should choose this bi-
centennial year of our independence to repudiate principles governing 
judicial interpretation of our Constitution settled since the time of Mr. 
Chief Justice John Marshall, discarding his postulate that the Constitu-
tion contemplates that restraints upon exercise by Congress of its plenary 
 
 51 426 U.S. 833 (1976). 
 52 Id. at 836. 
 53 Id. at 836–37. 
 54 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3 (“The Congress shall have Power . . . [t]o regulate Commerce 
with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes . . . .”). 
 55 Nat’l League, 426 U.S. at 852. 
 56 U.S. CONST. amend. X (“The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitu-
tion, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively . . . .”). 
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commerce power lie in the political process and not in the judicial pro-
cess.57 
This passage frames the rest of Brennan’s dissent.  Framing “is the 
process whereby communicators act—consciously or not—to con-
struct a particular point of view that encourages the facts of a given 
situation to be viewed in a particular manner . . . .”58  Frames are “cen-
tral organizing ideas within a narrative account of an issue or event; 
they provide the interpretive cues for otherwise neutral facts.”59  
Framing allows the author to construct a narrative that will persuade 
readers to recognize and adopt their line of argument.60  Frames assist 
both the author and the audience in “defin[ing] prob-
lems . . . diagnos[ing] causes . . . mak[ing] moral judgments . . . and 
sugges[ting] remedies.”61  Robert Entman, Professor at The George 
Washington School of Media and Public Affairs, notes “text contains 
frames, which are manifested by the presence or absence of certain 
keywords, stock phrases, stereotyped images, sources of information, 
and sentences that provide thematically reinforcing clusters of facts 
or judgments.”62  Examples of framing devices include:  metaphors, 
exemplars, catchphrases, depictions, and visual images.  Here, Justice 
Brennan uses the image of John Marshall—a Revolutionary War vet-
eran and “father” of the Supreme Court—to draw a causal connec-
tion between American independence and the limited scope of judi-
cial review.63  One might argue further that judicial independence, as 
evoked by Marshall in his most famous opinion—Marbury v. Madi-
son—is possible only where the judiciary operates within the limited 
 
 57 Nat’l League, 426 U.S. at 857 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
 58 Kuypers, supra note 24, at 182. 
 59 Id. 
 60 For examples discussing the differential effects of framing, see PAUL M. SNIDERMAN ET 
AL., REASONING AND CHOICE:  EXPLORATIONS IN POLITICAL PSYCHOLOGY 52 (1991) (con-
sidering the issue of mandatory testing for HIV (human immunodeficiency virus) and 
finding that a majority of the public supported the rights of persons with AIDS (acquired 
imuno-deficiency syndrome) against mandatory testing when framed as a civil liberties is-
sue, but that the majority supported mandatory testing when framed as a public health is-
sue); Thomas E. Nelson et al., Media Framing of a Civil Liberties Conflict and Its Effects on Tol-
erance, 91 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 567, 577–79 (1997) (concluding that audiences expressed 
more tolerance for a Ku Klux Klan march when framed as a free speech issue than when 
framed as a disruption of public order issue). 
 61 Entman, supra note 28, at 52 (emphasis omitted). 
 62 Id.  
 63 For a discussion of John Marshall’s service in the Revolutionary War, see generally 
CHARLES F. HOBSON, THE GREAT CHIEF JUSTICE:  JOHN MARSHALL AND THE RULE OF LAW 
(1996); JAMES F. SIMON, WHAT KIND OF NATION:  THOMAS JEFFERSON, JOHN MARSHALL, 
AND THE EPIC STRUGGLE TO CREATE A UNITED STATES (2002); JEAN EDWARD SMITH, JOHN 
MARSHALL:  DEFINER OF A NATION (1996). 
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scope of its authority.  The passage’s structure causes the reader to 
make a choice:  to side with John Marshall and the founding of Amer-
ica or to reject those principles in favor of the decision of the National 
League Court majority. 
The theme of Justice Brennan’s dissent is that the majority has 
usurped the role of the political process by claiming that judicial en-
forcement of the Tenth Amendment is a legitimate restraint on Con-
gress’s exercise of its Commerce Clause power.64  He assembles a col-
lection of materials including academic publications,65 case law,66 
congressional debates of the Bill of Rights,67 and legal treatises68 as 
precedential authority to support his contention that the “sole design 
[of the Tenth Amendment] is to exclude any interpretation, by which 
other powers should be assumed beyond those which are granted.”69  
Brennan concludes his argument by invoking the 1937 Court-Packing 
Plan, suggesting that the majority in National League is simply disguis-
ing its political preferences in constitutional garb, an effort unbefit-
ting justices of the Supreme Court who hold their unelected positions 
solely by virtue of their legal integrity and institutional conscience: 
Today’s repudiation of this unbroken line of precedents that firmly reject 
my Brethren’s ill-conceived abstraction can only be regarded as a trans-
parent cover for invalidating a congressional judgment with which they 
disagree.  The only analysis even remotely resembling that adopted today 
is found in a line of opinions dealing with the Commerce Clause and the 
Tenth Amendment that ultimately provoked a constitutional crisis for the 
Court in the 1930’s.  We tend to forget that the Court invalidated legisla-
tion during the Great Depression, not solely under the Due Process 
Clause, but also and primarily under the Commerce Clause and the 
Tenth Amendment.  It may have been the eventual abandonment of that overly 
 
 64 Nat’l League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833, 858 (1976) (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
 65 Id. at 862 (citing FELIX FRANKFURTER, THE COMMERCE CLAUSE UNDER MARSHALL, TANEY, 
AND WAITE 39–40 (1937)). 
 66 Id. at 861 n.4, 862, 863 & n.5 (citing Fry v. United States, 421 U.S. 542, 547 n.7 (1975); 
Fry, 421 U.S. at 557 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 124 
(1941); Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. 1, 196 (1824); McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316, 
404–07 (1819); Martin v. Hunter’s Lessee, 14 U.S. 304, 324–25 (1816)). 
 67 Id. at 863 n.5 (citing 2 THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE 
ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 123, 131 (Jonathan Elliot ed., 2d ed. 1836); 3 
THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS OF THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL 
CONSTITUTION 450, 464, 600 (Jonathan Elliot ed., 2d ed. 1836); 4 THE DEBATES IN THE 
SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 140, 148 
(Jonathan Elliot ed., 2d ed. 1836); 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 432, 761, 767–68 (1789) (Joseph 
Gales ed., 1834)). 
 68 Id. (citing 2 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 
612 §§ 1907–1908 (2d ed. 1851)). 
 69 Id. (quoting 2 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED 
STATES § 1908 (2d ed. 1851)). 
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restrictive construction of the commerce power that spelled defeat for the Court-
packing plan, and preserved the integrity of this institution, but my Brethren 
today are transparently trying to cut back on that recognition of the 
scope of the commerce power.  My Brethren’s approach to this case is 
not far different from the dissenting opinions in the cases that averted 
the crisis.70 
The rhetorical strategies embedded in Brennan’s reference to the 
1937 Court-packing incident function on two levels.  First, as a histor-
ical analogy, it appeals to logic or logos.  It provides the reader with a 
cause-and-effect lens through which to view the National League 
Court’s majority decision.  By comparing the 1976 Court’s decision-
making to that of the 1930s Court, Brennan guides the reader to the 
following conclusion:  if the 1930s Court’s constrained interpretation 
of the commerce power led to a constitutional crisis averted only by 
its eventual abandonment of that interpretation, and if the 1976 
Court’s majority decision parallels that initially constrained interpre-
tation, then the 1976 decision will lead to a similar constitutional cri-
sis. 
The second function of this passage is to evoke pathos, i.e., to per-
suade by appealing to the emotion of the audience.  The key emotive 
word of the passage is “crisis.”  The passage constructs a narrative of 
fear and abatement around this word.  First, Brennan links the two 
Courts through their “ill-conceived” analyses, both of which are 
grounded in a politically-driven interpretation of the Tenth Amend-
ment.  This interpretation “provoked a constitutional crisis for the 
Court in the 1930’s.”71  After the fear is established, the passage offers 
the strategy for abatement, a release from crisis:  “abandonment of 
that overly restrictive construction . . . .”72  This structure compliments 
Brennan’s position, which is that the Court’s sharp interpretive turn 
in 1937 is what preserved the institution’s integrity, rather than what 
called it into question.  Note also that the term “Court-packing” is it-
self pejorative, as it suggests that the President, to safeguard his New 
Deal agenda, must change the voting arithmetic on the Court by in-
creasing the number of justices and filling the new positions with 
those who support his policies.  In this way, court-packing is the judi-
cial equivalent of ballot box stuffing.  It signifies a blatant effort to 
bend the rules—to cheat—when one cannot win any other way. 
Brennan’s use of the Court-Packing Plan language reveals a fun-
damental assumption underlying his interpretation and articulation 
 
 70 Id. at 867–68 (emphasis added) (footnotes omitted) (internal citations omitted). 
 71 Id. at 868. 
 72 Id. 
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of the 1937 Court’s behavior.  Specifically, Brennan needs his readers 
to accept a priori that the Court’s survival as a legitimate government 
institution required that the Court abandon the “overly restrictive 
construction of the commerce power.”73  The Court’s acceptance of a 
new construction of the commerce power preserved the integrity of 
the Court in terms of raw institutional power, i.e., it stopped (defeat-
ed) the Court-Packing Plan, an unprecedented and destabilizing 
challenge to the Court’s independence.  In this sense, the term 
“Court-Packing Plan” signifies an external threat to the Court, precip-
itated by Court decisions that are out of sync with political reality. 
Reference to a historical event is often an effective strategy for 
supporting an argumentative position.  It immediately establishes a 
connection between the writer and the reader, providing a common 
starting point from which to process and evaluate the writer’s claims 
and assertions.  How a writer frames the historical event, however, re-
veals much about how the writer understands and perceives the event 
itself.  The 1937 Court-Packing Plan as a historical episode allows it to 
function as a linguistic trope.  Supreme Court Justices like Frankfur-
ter and Brennan have appropriated the episode and adopted the 
“Court-Packing Plan” language as part of an argument strategy that 
functions as protective cover for the Court.  The “Court-Packing 
Plan” language reminds the reader of a time when the political 
branches attacked the institutional hegemony of the federal judiciary.  
It elicits both a logical and emotional response from the reader that 
emphasizes the importance of judicial institutional integrity both in 
terms of independence and constitutional decision-making authority. 
III.  REFERENCE TO THE SWITCH IN TIME TO ADVANCE AN ARGUMENT 
ABOUT JUDICIAL INTERPRETIVE METHODOLOGY 
As with any narrative, there are two sides to the events surround-
ing Roosevelt’s attempt to reorganize the Supreme Court story.  So 
far, this Article has considered what some judicial writers mean when 
they refer to this event as the “Court-Packing Plan.”  It is now time to 
consider the alternate characterization of the 1937 event:  “the switch 
in time that saved nine.”  This section will discuss how this alternate 
choice in phrasing signifies a critique of cynical or unprincipled judi-
cial decision-making where a Justice employs whatever legal analysis 
will produce the policy outcome he or she prefers.  By its very nature, 
this critique also implicates the debate over the proper scope of judi-
 
 73 Id. 
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cial review.  For those who use the “switch in time” language, the 
Court’s occasional lapses into policymaking masked as judicial inter-
pretation threatens the judiciary’s legitimacy and its place within the 
Constitution’s tripartite system.  In this way, the term “switch in time” 
operates as a trope to signify an internal threat to the Court, a corro-
sive force within the judicial chamber itself. 
As I will show, however, the “switch in time” language is not always 
used in the same way or for the same ends.  Sometimes a judicial 
writer will deploy “switch in time” to refer to a cynical shift in the 
Court’s position with respect to a certain issue.  Those who take this 
position generally think that the anti-New Deal decisions of the 
Hughes Court were grounded in sound legal methodology, i.e., the 
doctrine of stare decisis and the text of the Constitution itself.  Under 
this view, the “obstinacy” of the Hughes Court strengthened rather 
than undermined the integrity of the judicial branch.  According to 
this perspective, it was not until Justice Owen Roberts “flipped” his 
vote in West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish74 and created a pro-New Deal ma-
jority that the Court’s integrity as a judicial body came into question.  
Whether perceived as an act of institutional self-preservation or as ju-
dicial “flip-flopping” at its analytical worst, the “switch in time” repre-
sents to some the kind of outcome-driven decision-making that has 
no place in a law court. 
United States v. Kitsch is an example of a judicial writer’s choice to 
use the phrase “switch in time” that saved nine to refer to the 1937 
episode.75  In Kitsch, a grand jury had voted to indict William J. Kitsch 
on “two counts of being a felon in possession of a firearm” and “one 
count of being a violent felon in possession of body armor” in viola-
tion of federal law.76  Kitsch filed a motion to dismiss his indictment, 
claiming the federal law regulations were outside the scope of Con-
gress’s Commerce Clause power.77  Although the district court denied 
Kitsch’s motion and upheld Congress’s action to prohibit felony pos-
session of firearms and body armor under the Commerce Clause,78 
the judge’s opinion cited with approval two recent Supreme Court 
cases—United States v. Lopez79 and United States v. Morrison80—that 
 
 74 300 U.S. 379 (1937). 
 75 307 F. Supp. 2d 657, 660 (E.D. Pa. 2004). 
 76 Id. at 658. 
 77 Id. 
 78 Id. at 660–61.  The statutory language required that the firearm must have traveled 
through interstate commerce (at least once) and the body armor must be “sold or offered 
for sale, in interstate or foreign commerce.”  Id. at 661. 
 79 514 U.S. 549 (1995). 
 80 529 U.S. 598 (2000). 
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reigned in congressional power under the Commerce Clause.81  For 
our purposes, this case represents an opportunity to analyze what the 
choice of the “switch in time” language may reveal about the rhetori-
cal significance attached to that particular phrase. 
In Kitsch, the judicial writer, Judge Stewart R. Dalzell of the United 
States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, elects 
not to refer to the 1937 episode as the “Court-Packing Plan” and in-
stead employs the “switch in time” language.  Specifically, he indi-
cates that the holdings in Lopez and Morrison represent a long overdue 
return to the Commerce Clause jurisprudence of the early 1930s, 
when the Court routinely set aside New Deal legislation for going be-
yond the commerce powers articulated in the Constitution.82  Judge 
Dalzell’s text represents the idea that the Court was at its principled 
best during this period, bravely maintaining the delicate balance be-
tween the judiciary and the political branches.  This balance was then 
upset by Justice Owens and his “switch in time,” which ushered in 
more than fifty years of federal aggrandizement under the Com-
merce Clause:  “[t]he Court’s holdings in Lopez and Morri-
son . . . emphasized the limits of the commerce power in ways unseen 
since the famous ‘switch in time.’”83 
 As discussed in Part II, the “Court-Packing Plan” phrase tends to 
be used to identify unauthorized or unwanted attacks on the judiciary 
from outside, i.e., from the political branches.  That is, writers typical-
ly employ the “Court-Packing Plan” language when:  (a) challenging 
an ultra vires action of the President or Congress or (b) issuing a 
warning that such an action may occur if the Court does not alter its 
current course.  By contrast, writers use the “switch in time” language 
to critique the behavior of the Court.  The “switch” language choice 
reframes the historical episode from an attack on what was done to 
the Court (by President Roosevelt’s reorganization proposal) to an 
indictment of what the 1937 Hughes Court did in response.  Thus, 
for example, when Judge Dalzell writes approvingly of the Court’s re-
cent decisions in Lopez and Morrison, he means to:  (a) draw a sharp 
distinction between the then-current Court and the Courts that oc-
cupied the supreme bench between 1937 and 1995, and (b) connect 
 
 81 Kitsch, 307 F. Supp. 2d at 659 (“The Court continued to interpret the Commerce Clause 
expansively in the years after Scarborough, but eventually, in the seminal case of United 
States v. Lopez, it signaled a renewed interest in identifying the outer reaches of the com-
merce power. . . . Morrison again demonstrated the Court’s reinvigorated commitment to 
enforcing constitutional limits on legislative power . . . .”) (internal citations omitted). 
 82 Id. at 659–61. 
 83 Id. at 660. 
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the Lopez and Morrison Courts to the Hughes Court of the early 1930s, 
which Dalzell considers more juridically principled.  The reference to 
the “famous switch in time” operates as both a temporal and juris-
prudential boundary:  it symbolizes the precise moment the Court 
lost its way and became the great rationalizer for federal intrusion in-
to the rights of the states. 
Here, the purpose of referencing the 1937 event is not to remind 
the reader of a moment when the President tried to destroy the judi-
ciary’s independence, thereby jeopardizing the institutional structure 
supported by separation of powers and the system of checks and bal-
ances.  Rather, the reference signifies that the Court, when it shifted 
its position in 1937 in West Coast Hotel, deviated from the proper 
standards of constitutional interpretive methodology by substituting 
external political pressure for legal principle. 
That the writer believes the Court’s interpretive misconduct has 
been institutionalized is revealed by Dalzell’s use of the word “un-
seen.”84  Broadly construed, “unseen” may be directed at the Court en 
masse.  In other words, the text embeds an implication that the in-
terpretive principles underlying the Supreme Court’s 1995 and 2000 
decisions in Lopez and Morrison, respectively, limiting congressional 
power have not been seen since the pre-1937 Hughes Court.  This in-
terpretation invites the reader to consider the nature of the Court 
from an ideological perspective, i.e., the 1995 and 2000 Supreme 
Court has appropriately returned to the constitutional principles that 
guided the conservative Court in 1936.  The ideological overlay im-
plies that during the intervening fifty-nine years, the Court operated 
in a politically-driven, legally unprincipled way, at least when con-
fronted with Commerce Clause questions. 
As I will show in the next section of this Article, however, the 
“switch in time” trope has also been used to argue in favor of over-
turning prior decisions that the author believes were driven by the 
value judgments of the Justices rather than by sound legal reasoning.  
In this sense, the “switch in time” represents a positive judicial re-
sponse, a necessary internal corrective to the Court’s previous errors 
of legal judgment. 
 
 84 Id. 
Oct. 2012] FDR’S COURT-PACKING PLAN 81 
 
IV.  COMPETING FRAME ANALYSIS:  REFINING THE TROPES TO CRITIQUE 
EXTERNAL AND INTERNAL THREATS TO THE JUDICIARY 
This section analyzes the extent to which the two previously dis-
cussed institutional arguments supported by the 1937 Court-packing 
episode—the judicial “independence” and the judicial “interpretive 
methodology” arguments—have developed.  In this section, I con-
duct a framing analysis of the 1937 event as referenced by judicial 
writers in two separate opinions within the same Supreme Court case, 
Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey.85  I first looked 
at how the joint opinion of Justices O’Connor, Kennedy, and Souter 
framed the episode.  Next, I looked at how Justice Scalia framed the 
same episode in his concurrence/dissent.  This analysis finds that 
while judicial writers continue to choose between the “Court-packing” 
and “switch in time” language, with the former focusing on the judi-
ciary’s institutional autonomy from the political branches and the lat-
ter focusing on the judiciary’s interpretive autonomy within itself, the 
use of the competing frames has developed into more nuanced ar-
guments about protecting the Court against external versus internal 
threats to judicial autonomy.  The implication of this development is 
to increase the symbolic power and rhetorical significance of the 
1937 episode. 
A. Case Summary:  Planned Parenthood of Southeastern 
Pennsylvania v. Casey 
In Casey, 86 abortion clinics and physicians brought a Due Process 
Clause challenge to five provisions of the Pennsylvania Abortion Con-
trol Act of 198287 (“PACA”).  The amendments to PACA required, 
among other things, that a woman give her informed consent before 
the procedure and after a twenty-four-hour waiting period within 
which she was to receive certain contemplative information.88  Anoth-
er provision required the informed consent of one of the parents of a 
minor seeking the procedure, providing for a judicial bypass if the 
minor either wished to proceed without parental consent or could 
not obtain it.89  In addition, the PACA amendments provided that, 
except in certain circumstances, a married woman must submit a 
 
 85 505 U.S. 833 (1992). 
 86 Casey, 505 U.S. at 844–45 (O’Connor, Kennedy & Souter, JJ., Opinion of the Court). 
 87 18 PA. CONS. STAT. §§ 3203–3220 (1990). 
 88 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 3205 (1990). 
 89 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 3206(c) (1990). 
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written statement that she notified her spouse of her intent to have 
the procedure.90 
In a 5-4 decision, the Court upheld most of the Pennsylvania pro-
visions, striking down only that part of the PACA that required spous-
al notification.91  And while Casey reaffirmed a woman’s fundamental 
right to decide “whether or not to terminate her pregnancy” as rec-
ognized in Roe v. Wade,92 the Casey plurality articulated that it was only 
preserving “the essential holding” of Roe.93  Thus, the Casey Court re-
jected the Roe trimester framework and replaced it with a new “undue 
burden” standard by which to analyze the validity of all abortion re-
strictions.94 
The decision in Casey was the product of a highly fractured Court, 
resulting in the unusual circumstance of a joint opinion crafted and 
authored by Justices O’Connor, Kennedy, and Souter.95  In Casey, 
Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices White, Scalia, and Thomas ap-
plied a rational basis standard of review and voted to overrule Roe and 
uphold all of the challenged provisions of the Pennsylvania statute.96  
Justice Blackmun applied strict scrutiny and argued that the Court 
should uphold Roe in its entirety and strike down all of the PACA 
amendments.97  Justice Stevens also applied a variation of the joint 
opinion’s “undue burden” standard,98 endorsed Roe, and voted to 
strike down most but not all of the PACA amendments.99  Amid these 
extremes, Justices O’Connor, Kennedy, and Souter issued a joint 
opinion.  Their opinion neither overruled nor preserved undisturbed 
 
 90 18 PA.  CONS. STAT. § 3209 (1990). 
 91 Casey, 505 U.S. at 895 (O’Connor, Kennedy & Souter, JJ., Opinion of the Court). 
 92 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973). 
 93 Casey, 505 U.S. at 846, 870, 871 (O’Connor, Kennedy & Souter, JJ., Opinion of the 
Court). 
 94 Id. at 877–78.  Under this standard, the Court asks whether a state abortion regulation 
has the purpose or effect of imposing an “undue burden,” defined as a “substantial obsta-
cle in the path of a woman seeking an abortion before the fetus attains viability.”  Id. at 
878. 
 95 Id. at 843. 
 96 Id. at 944, 966 (Rehnquist, C.J., White, Scalia & Thomas, JJ., concurring in part and dis-
senting in part) (“A woman’s interest in having an abortion is a form of liberty protected 
by the Due Process Clause, but States may regulate abortion procedures in ways rationally 
related to a legitimate state interest.”). 
 97 Id. at 926 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“Our precedents and 
the joint opinion’s principles require us to subject all non-de-minimus abortion regulations 
to strict scrutiny.  Under this standard, the Pennsylvania statute’s provisions . . . must be 
invalidated.”). 
 98 Id. at 920 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“In my opinion . . . [a] 
burden may be ‘undue’ either because the burden is too severe or because it lacks a legit-
imate, rational justification.”). 
 99 Id. at 912, 917 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
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Roe v. Wade and established the undue burden legal standard, a mid-
point between rational basis and strict scrutiny.100  With this basic un-
derstanding of the facts and the different positions of the Justices, the 
rest of this section focuses on the competing frames of the 1937 
Court episode used in the O’Connor, Kennedy, and Souter joint 
opinion and Justice Scalia’s concurrence/dissent. 
B. The Joint Opinion:  Using the “Court-Packing” Frame to Critique 
External Threats to Judicial Independence 
As indicated by the above case summary, the immediate question 
for the Court in Casey was whether various requirements added to 
Pennsylvania’s Abortion Control Act violated a woman’s constitution-
al right to terminate her pregnancy as announced in Roe v. Wade.  
However, the larger issue with which the Court dealt was whether it 
should overrule Roe.  This larger issue required the Court to articu-
late its views on the importance of precedent and its understanding 
of the function and application of stare decisis.  The reference to the 
1937 event in the joint opinion by Justices O’Connor, Kennedy, and 
Souter occurs in that portion of the opinion that deals with stare de-
cisis.101 
The joint opinion discusses stare decisis in three parts.  The first 
part acknowledges that adherence to precedent is not absolute, sets 
forth criteria to determine when deviation from precedent is war-
ranted, and analyzes Roe based on that criteria.102  The second part 
compares Roe with “two . . . decisional lines from the past century” 
that are “of comparable dimension” to Roe wherein the Court did 
 
100 Id. at 874 (O’Connor, Kennedy & Souter, JJ., Opinion of the Court) (“The fact that a law 
which serves a valid purpose, one not designed to strike at the [abortion] right itself, has 
the incidental effect of making it more difficult or more expensive to procure an abor-
tion cannot be enough to invalidate it.  Only where state regulation imposes an undue 
burden on a woman’s ability to make the decision does the power of the State reach into 
the heart of the liberty protected by the Due Process Clause.”). 
101 Id. at 854, 854–69 (“[W]hen this Court reexamines a prior holding, its judgment is cus-
tomarily informed by a series of prudential and pragmatic considerations designed to test 
the consistency of overruling a prior decision with the ideal of the rule of law, and to 
gauge the respective costs of reaffirming and overruling a prior case.”). 
102 Id. at 855 (“So in this case we may enquire whether Roe’s central rule has been found un-
workable; whether the rule’s limitation on state power could be removed without serious 
inequity to those who have relied upon it or significant damage to the stability of the so-
ciety governed by it; whether the law’s growth in the intervening years has left Roe’s cen-
tral rule a doctrinal anachronism discounted by society; and whether Roe’s premises of 
fact have so far changed in the ensuing two decades as to render its central holding 
somehow irrelevant or unjustifiable in dealing with the issue it addressed.”). 
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overrule precedent.103  In the third part, the Court justifies its deci-
sion not to overrule Roe in its entirety by describing the dangers in-
herent in:  (1) frequent overruling of precedent and (2) overruling 
“under fire” a “watershed decision” meant to moderate “contending 
sides of a national controversy.”104  The reference to the 1937 event 
occurs in the second part of this discussion.  The following analysis is 
therefore limited to that part of the joint opinion. 
The plurality identifies two instances where the Court overruled 
precedent and proceeds to distinguish those instances from the cur-
rent case.105  The two instances the plurality examined were:  (1) West 
Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish,106 where in 1937, the Court overruled Adkins 
v. Children’s Hospital107 and (2) Brown v. Board of Education,108 where in 
1954, the Court overruled Plessy v. Ferguson.109  The plurality argued, 
“West Coast Hotel and Brown each rested on facts, or an understanding 
of facts, changed from those which furnished the claimed justifica-
tions for the earlier constitutional resolutions.”110  Thus, the Court 
operated completely within its authority when overturning cases 
where the original factual assumptions were false or had changed.111  
For example, the Court in Brown was justified in overruling Plessy be-
cause the socio-racial assumptions underlying that decision no longer 
obtained.112  The same is true of Adkins, which was effectively over-
ruled by West Coast Hotel following the 1937 Court-packing episode.113  
Specifically, the plurality argues that the Court had a duty to overturn 
Adkins because the economic assumptions giving rise to that decision 
no longer existed in fact.114  The plurality pointed out, however, that 
 
103 Id. at 861, 861–64. 
104 Id. at 867. 
105 Id. at 861. 
106 300 U.S. 379 (1937). 
107 261 U.S. 525 (1923). 
108 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
109 163 U.S. 537 (1896). 
110 Casey, 505 U.S. at 863 (joint opinion of O’Connor, Kennedy & Souter, JJ., Opinion of the 
Court). 
111 Id. at 864 (“In constitutional adjudication as elsewhere in life, changed circumstances 
may impose new obligations, and the thoughtful part of the Nation could accept each de-
cision [Brown and West Coast Hotel] to overrule a prior case as a response to the Court’s 
constitutional duty.”). 
112  347 U.S. 483, 490–92 (1954). 
113 Id. at 861–62 (“As Justice Jackson wrote of the constitutional crisis of 1937 shortly before 
he came on the bench:  ‘The older world of laissez faire was recognized everywhere out-
side the Supreme Court to be dead.’” (quoting JACKSON, supra note 2, at 85)). 
114 Id. at 862 (“[T]he clear demonstration that the facts of economic life [by the time of West 
Coast Hotel] were different from those previously assumed [in Adkins] warranted the re-
pudiation of the old law.”). 
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the conditions requiring this kind of reversal were not present in the 
current case.115 
The main theme advanced by the plurality’s discussion of stare 
decisis is legitimacy.  Indeed, the plurality premised its analysis of ac-
ceptable deviation from stare decisis on the idea that the Court re-
tains its legitimacy when it overturns cases that are based on false fac-
tual assumptions: 
The facts upon which [Adkins] had premised a constitutional resolution 
of social controversy had proven to be untrue, and history’s demonstra-
tion of their untruth not only justified but required the new choice of 
constitutional principle that West Coast Hotel announced.  Of course, it 
was true that the Court lost something by its misperception, or its lack of 
prescience, and the Court-packing crisis only magnified the loss; but the 
clear demonstration that the facts of economic life were different from 
those previously assumed warranted the repudiation of the old law.116 
What is noteworthy here is the subtlety with which the plurality uses 
the linguistic trope of the “Court-packing” language to advance its 
argument about protecting institutional independence.  Earlier anal-
ysis of the “Court-packing” phrase in this Article argued that the 
phrase is typically used in situations where the judiciary perceives it-
self in a defensive posture vis-à-vis the political branches.  Invoking 
the “Court-packing” language is meant to trigger a sympathetic re-
sponse in the reader of wanting to secure and protect the judicial in-
stitution from encroachment by Congress or the President.  The Casey 
plurality’s use of the “Court-packing” phrase expands on this initial 
idea of protection from external threat. 
There is a fine line between hegemonic and independent.  As you 
move toward the first, you risk losing the second.  Here, the ultimate 
goal is to defend judicial independence.  However, the Casey plurality 
is presented with a situation where it must make a principled argu-
ment as to why overruling precedent in some instances secures the 
Court’s legitimacy while in others, overruling precedent damages it.  
Complicating this predicament is the fact that each response—
overruling and not overruling precedent—must be judicially driven 
and based on sound legal reasoning.  The plurality navigates this dif-
ficulty by acknowledging the dichotomy between hegemony and in-
dependence.  The use of the “Court-packing” phrase externally lo-
cates the source of the deviation from stare decisis outside of the 
 
115 Id. at 864 (“Because neither the factual underpinnings of Roe’s central holding nor our 
understanding of it has changed . . . the Court could not pretend to be reexamining the 
prior law with any justification beyond a present doctrinal disposition to come out differ-
ently from the Court of 1973.”). 
116 Id. at 862. 
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judiciary:  the reason that the Court is justified in overruling prece-
dent is because society’s understanding of the facts underpinning the 
prior decisions has changed.  Given this circumstance, the Court is 
presented with two options.  It can either unilaterally impose a factual 
understanding of a reality that no longer exists or it can adapt to so-
ciety’s modified understanding of its reality.  The former jeopardizes 
the Court’s legitimacy by suggesting the judiciary is exercising unau-
thorized domination over the other branches, while the latter secures 
the credibility of the Court as an institution and promotes acceptance 
of judicial independence.  The plurality’s use of the “Court-packing” 
language works to maintain the focus on external changes outside of 
the Court. 
C. Justice Scalia’s Concurrence/Dissent:  Using the “Switch in Time” 
Frame to Critique the Internal Behavior of the Court 
Like the joint opinion, Justice Scalia’s concurrence/dissent in Ca-
sey focuses on the Court’s legitimacy.  However, whereas the joint 
opinion deployed the term “Court-Packing Plan” to signify external 
threats to the Court as an institution, Scalia uses the term “switch in 
time” to signify certain behaviors internal to the Court that jeopardize 
its legitimacy as a judicial body.  Scalia attacks the plurality opinion 
for retaining aspects of Roe that Scalia believes are founded on defec-
tive legal reasoning.  These, he argues, should be abandoned lest they 
persist and damage the integrity of the Court.  To make his point, 
Scalia calls on—and then distinguishes—two landmark cases in the 
Court’s jurisprudential history, Dred Scott v. Sandford117 and West Coast 
Hotel Co. v. Parrish:118 
[T]he Court was covered with dishonor and deprived of legitimacy by 
Dred Scott v. Sandford, an erroneous (and widely opposed) opinion that it 
did not abandon, rather than by West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, which 
produced the famous “switch in time” from the Court’s erroneous (and 
widely opposed) constitutional opposition to the social measures of the 
New Deal.119 
As this passage attests, for Scalia the 1937 “switch in time” saved 
the Court from dishonor—dishonor caused by allowing economic 
philosophy to dictate judicial interpretation.  Therefore, according to 
Scalia, the Court’s shift in 1937 was prompted not by the threats 
posed by President Roosevelt, but by the Court’s recognition of its 
 
117 60 U.S. 393 (1856). 
118 300 U.S. 379 (1937). 
119 Casey, 505 U.S. at 998 (Scalia, Rehnquist, C.J., White, Thomas, JJ., concurring in part and 
dissenting in part) (internal citations omitted). 
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own flawed reasoning in the earlier New Deal Cases.  The issue, then, 
as framed by Scalia, is whether the plurality opinion in Casey more 
closely resembles Dred Scott or West Coast Hotel. 
Scalia is quick in his answer.  He portrays the plurality opinion as 
a mere expression of the particular values of the three Justices who 
drafted it, not as a judicial position derived through the application 
of established legal doctrine:  “the best the Court can do to explain 
how it is that the word ‘liberty’ must be thought to include the right 
to destroy human fetuses is to rattle off a collection of adjectives that 
simply decorate a value judgment and conceal a political choice.”120 
 In Scalia’s view, the plurality opinion in Casey perpetuates the in-
terpretive errors first articulated in Roe; and because Roe functions as 
a legal mask to “a political choice,” it is unprincipled and dangerous 
to the judiciary.  By refusing to abandon Roe, the plurality in Casey 
leaves a wrong-headed decision in place—an act (or omission) similar 
to letting Dred Scott stand even after it was shown to be legally inde-
fensible.  What reproductive rights law needs, according to Scalia, is 
not the continuation of Roe (however altered), but a “switch in time” 
that returns the Court to its proper and limited role as the interpret-
er of legal texts, for there is danger in yielding to unrestrained or un-
principled methods of judicial decision-making: 
As long as this Court thought (and the people thought) that we Justices 
were doing essentially lawyers’ work up here—reading text and discern-
ing our society’s traditional understanding of that text—the public pretty 
much left us alone. . . . [I]f, as I say, our pronouncement of constitution-
al law rests primarily on value judgments, then a free and intelligent 
people’s attitude towards us can be expected to be (ought to be) quite dif-
ferent.121 
For Scalia, the key to maintaining the Court’s legitimacy is proper ju-
dicial behavior.  The Court damages its legitimacy when individual 
justices abandon legal principle to advance a policy preference. 
As indicated above, Scalia uses the term “switch in time” as a lin-
guistic trope to target judicial behavior.  This is consistent with the 
examples previously analyzed in this Article.  However, Scalia adds an 
additional layer of complexity to the trope.  He writes that the inter-
pretive turn created by the “switch in time” was in response to “the 
Court’s erroneous (and widely opposed) constitutional opposition to 
 
120 Id. at 983; see also id. at 1000 (“[P]ermeat[ing] today’s opinion [is] a new mode of consti-
tutional adjudication that relies not upon text and traditional practice to determine the 
law, but upon what the Court calls ‘reasoned judgment,’ which turns out to be nothing 
but philosophical predilection and moral intuition.” (internal citation omitted)). 
121 Id. at 1000–01. 
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the social measures of the New Deal.”122  Ironically, however, the 1937 
Court’s decision in West Coast ushered in an era of expanded federal 
power under the Commerce Clause123—something Scalia has typically 
opposed during his tenure on the bench.124  Given his constitutional 
conservatism, it seems incongruous for Scalia to cite favorably to a ju-
dicial moment that expanded the reach of the federal government.  
However, in this case, he is citing to West Coast for a limited and spe-
cific purpose—to encourage the Court to overrule what he believes 
was an ill-reasoned precedent:  Roe v. Wade.  Use of the “switch in 
time” language allows Scalia to take a core judicial moment, which is 
fundamental to the social welfare legislation of the New Deal, and 
turn it on its head to support a politically conservative position.  
Framed in this context, those who support the 1937 interpretive shift 
produced by the “switch in time” likewise must support the overturn-
ing of Roe. 
*** 
The dominant theme of both the joint opinion and Justice Scalia’s 
concurrence/dissent is the legitimacy of the Court.  However, the two 
opinions do not locate the danger to the Court’s legitimacy in the 
same place.  The plurality focuses on external threats to the judiciary 
that arise when the Court’s factual assumptions no longer comport 
with social reality, thus raising the hackles of the President and/or 
Congress; if the Court does not direct its jurisprudence to the new 
factual paradigm, it risks being marginalized by the political branches 
 
122 Id. at 998. 
123 See, e.g., Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942) (upholding the Agricultural Adjustment 
Act of 1938 against challenges under the Commerce Clause and Fifth Amendment); 
United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1941) (upholding the Fair Labor Standards Act); 
NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937) (upholding the National Labor 
Relations Act of 1935 against a Commerce Clause challenge). 
124 Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2643 (2012) (Scalia, Kennedy, 
Thomas, and Alito, JJ., jointly dissenting) (“The striking case of Wickard v. Filburn, which 
held that the economic activity of growing wheat, even for one’s own consumption, af-
fected commerce sufficiently that it could be regulated, always has been regarded as the 
ne plus ultra of expansive Commerce Clause jurisprudence.  To go beyond that, and to say 
the failure to grow wheat (which is not an economic activity, or any activity at all) nonethe-
less affects commerce and therefore can be federally regulated, is to make mere breath-
ing in and out the basis for federal prescription and to extend federal power to virtually 
all human activity.” (internal citations omitted)); United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 
(2000) (holding that a regulation subjecting private individuals and companies to suit for 
gender-motivated violent torts is beyond Congress’s Commerce Clause power); United 
States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995) (holding that a regulation banning possession of 
firearms within a public school zone is beyond Congress’s Commerce Clause power). 
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and/or the public.  In this way, the term “Court-Packing Plan” signi-
fies the kind of external pressure that is applied to the Court when it 
does not react quickly enough to the ground shifting beneath its feet. 
Conversely, Scalia focuses on the fundamental internal threat to 
the Court’s legitimacy, namely judicial behavior that is driven by val-
ue choices rather than by legal doctrine.  For Scalia, there is (or 
should be) a purity to the act of applying the law, one which must be 
maintained for the Court to remain legitimate.  When a particular 
Court—or a majority of Justices—loses its way and begins to make ju-
dicial decisions based on policy preferences instead of established le-
gal rules, the Court must self-correct to save the only claim it has to 
authority:  its public image as a learned but apolitical body of legal 
experts.  Therefore, the Court, at various times in its history, has 
made—and will continue to make—the rare “switch in time” to reset 
its internal balance and find the proper mode of judicial behavior. 
Notwithstanding their contrary arguments, each of the two Casey 
opinions discussed above invoked the 1937 institutional clash be-
tween the President and the Supreme Court to support its position.  
That each was able to effectively do so is a product of the fact that two 
distinct linguistic tropes have developed around the 1937 episode:  a 
“Court-packing” trope to direct at external threats to the judiciary 
and a “switch in time” trope to direct at the members of the bench. 
CONCLUSION 
The federal courts have recognized that the 1937 Court-Packing 
Plan event is a powerful rhetorical tool.  Accordingly, they have creat-
ed institutional and methodological arguments grounded in the insti-
tutional clash.  Justices and judges have framed the event as the 
“Court-Packing Plan” to denote the institutional struggle for power 
and credibility between the judiciary and external threats to its legit-
imacy.  The broader issue associated with the “Court-Packing Plan” 
language seems to be protecting the integrity of the judicial institu-
tion and the independence of the judiciary.  This framing views judi-
cial institutional autonomy as fundamental and essential to the suc-
cess of our scheme of government. 
Conversely, some Justices and judges have framed the event as 
“the switch in time that saved nine” to denote the institutional strug-
gle within the judiciary for power and credibility related to the scope 
of its interpretive constitutional decision-making authority.  This 
framing views the 1937 episode as a cautionary tale about the dangers 
to the Court’s legitimacy brought on by internal judicial behavior.  
The “switch in time” framing submits that the interpretive turn in 
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1937 changed how we understand the scope and limitations of consti-
tutional interpretation, creating the potential, if unrestrained, to not 
only damage the Court, but also damage our entire system of gov-
ernment. 
The purpose of this Article is to show how a rhetorical orientation 
helps us to understand how the Court-Packing Plan episode—
through language choice—has entered our culture of argument 
about our system of government and the role of the judiciary as a 
constitutional decision-making body within that system.  The manner 
in which these language tropes are used is complex and, at least on 
the surface, can confound one’s initial assumptions about the writer 
who has selected them.  Nevertheless, the effort is usually worth the 
sweat, because a deep analysis of these tropes reveals meanings we 
may have overlooked.  We have seen that when judicial writers refer 
to the Court-Packing Plan or to the switch in time, they are almost al-
ways addressing the Court’s legitimacy and the threats to that legiti-
macy.  As it happens, those threats can be external or internal to the 
Court, and the tropes discussed in this Article—“ Court-Packing Plan” 
and “switch in time”—help us to understand which one is being 
framed by the author. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
